True enough

Knowledge, Theory of Comprehension Science Arts
MIT Press
2017
EISBN 9780262341370
Epistemology standardly holds that there can be no epistemically good reason to accept a known falsehood or to accept a mode of justification that is not truth-conducive. Such a stance cannot accommodate science, for science unabashedly relies on models, idealizations, and thought experiments which are known not to be true. We ought not assume that the inaccuracy of such devices is a sign of their inadequacy. When effective, they are felicitous falsehoods that exemplify features they share with the phenomena they bear on. Inasmuch as works of art also deploy felicitous falsehoods, they too advance understanding. 'True Enough' develops a holistic epistemology that focuses on the understanding of broad ranges of phenomena rather than on knowledge of individual facts. --Provided by publisher.
