Essays in political economy and international public finance

Game theory Economics International finance Finance, Public
Peter Lang
2009
EISBN 1299432646
Contents; 1 Introduction 5; 1.1 Game-theoretic analysis of the state 6; 1.2 The study of political accountability 8; 1.2.1 History and previous results 8; 1.2.2 Contribution of the thesis 17; 1.3 The study of fiscal competition 23; 1.3.1 History and previous results 24; 1.3.2 Contribution of the thesis 32; 2 Coalitions and political accountability 35; 2.1 Motivation 35; 2.2 Related literature 39; 2.3 Accountability of electoral blocs 42; 2.4 Accountability of the unity government 45; 2.5 Conclusion 55; 2.6 Appendix - Proof of Proposition 2 57; 3 Divisive politics and accountability 65
3.1 Motivation 653.2 Analysis 68; 3.2.1 The model 68; 3.2.2 Solving the accountability subgame 71; 3.2.3 Divisive politics in equilibrium 74; 3.2.4 Extension: Divisive politics by the opponent 75; 3.3 Conclusion 76; 4 Minimum taxes and repeated tax competition 79; 4.1 Motivation 79; 4.2 Related literature 81; 4.3 The Analysis 82; 4.4 Conclusion 88; Summary in German 89; Bibliography 97
3.1 Motivation 653.2 Analysis 68; 3.2.1 The model 68; 3.2.2 Solving the accountability subgame 71; 3.2.3 Divisive politics in equilibrium 74; 3.2.4 Extension: Divisive politics by the opponent 75; 3.3 Conclusion 76; 4 Minimum taxes and repeated tax competition 79; 4.1 Motivation 79; 4.2 Related literature 81; 4.3 The Analysis 82; 4.4 Conclusion 88; Summary in German 89; Bibliography 97
