Consciousness and object : a mind-object identity physicalist theory
Cognition Consciousness e-böcker
John Benjamins Publishing Company
2017
EISBN 9789027265098
Intro.
Consciousness and Object.
Editorial page.
Title page.
LCC data.
Table of contents.
Foreword.
Acknowledgements.
1. A materialist theory of the mind.
2. Naïve materialism.
2.1 The standard view.
2.2 The digestive model of the mind.
2.3 The hallucinatory model of perception.
2.4 Physiological minds and mechanical worlds.
2.5 The object-object problem.
2.6 Inner man and inner world.
2.7 Am I my body?.
3. Consciousness and nature.
3.1 Neural local supervenience and internalism.
3.2 Brain in a vat are no starters.
3.3 Misperception by and large.
3.4 Mental and physical are different.
3.5 The issue of representation and the vehicle/content dichotomy.
3.6 Appearance vs reality.
4. A mind-object identity theory.
4.1 Identity theories and consciousness.
4.2 brainbound.
4.3 objectbound.
4.4 Where am I?.
4.5 Mind and world.
4.6 The inner world is outside.
4.7 Linguistic boobytraps.
4.8 There's no distance between experience and world.
5. The actual object.
5.1 Actual objects vs naïve objects.
5.2 Existence and causation.
5.3 The joint cause.
5.4 Relative existence.
5.5 Bodies are object-makers.
5.6 Actual objects and time.
5.7 A hoard of actual objects.
5.8 Spatiotemporal objects.
6. Consciousness, body, and world.
6.1 The actual world.
6.2 Brains are never isolated.
6.3 Causal carvings.
6.4 Temporal unfolding.
6.5 Causal simultaneity.
6.6 Present and past are relative.
6.7 Time lag debunked.
7. All experience is identity.
7.1 Modes of perception.
7.2 A taxonomy for hallucinations.
7.3 Hallucinations and dreams.
7.4 Identity and hallucination.
7.5 The common-kind assumption turned upside down.
7.6 Illusions.
8. Neuroscientific evidence.
8.1 Penfield and direct brain stimulation.
8.2 Congenitally blind subjects and visual experience.
8.3 Hallucinations caused by sensory blockage.
8.4 Persisting objects.
8.5 Filtering the world: The case of afterimages.
8.6 Supersaturated red and other impossible colors.
9. Subjectivity reloaded.
9.1 Is the phenomenal physical?.
9.2 One kind of property to rule them all.
9.3 Subjective and objective are relative.
9.4 Measurement and causality.
9.5 Experience and knowledge.
9.6 Perceptual error.
9.7 Incorrigibility.
9.8 Feeling vs functioning.
10. A reduction.
10.1 The hard problem.
10.2 Intentionality or aboutness.
10.3 What it is like to be something.
10.4 Points of view and perspectivalness.
10.5 Semantics is identity.
Anchor 55.
11. A comparison with other views.
11.1 Idealism.
11.2 Enactivism.
11.3 Direct realism.
11.4 Russellian monism.
11.5 Panpsychism.
11.6 Soul-less Descartes.
12. The last blow to the narcissism of man.
Index.
Consciousness and Object.
Editorial page.
Title page.
LCC data.
Table of contents.
Foreword.
Acknowledgements.
1. A materialist theory of the mind.
2. Naïve materialism.
2.1 The standard view.
2.2 The digestive model of the mind.
2.3 The hallucinatory model of perception.
2.4 Physiological minds and mechanical worlds.
2.5 The object-object problem.
2.6 Inner man and inner world.
2.7 Am I my body?.
3. Consciousness and nature.
3.1 Neural local supervenience and internalism.
3.2 Brain in a vat are no starters.
3.3 Misperception by and large.
3.4 Mental and physical are different.
3.5 The issue of representation and the vehicle/content dichotomy.
3.6 Appearance vs reality.
4. A mind-object identity theory.
4.1 Identity theories and consciousness.
4.2 brainbound.
4.3 objectbound.
4.4 Where am I?.
4.5 Mind and world.
4.6 The inner world is outside.
4.7 Linguistic boobytraps.
4.8 There's no distance between experience and world.
5. The actual object.
5.1 Actual objects vs naïve objects.
5.2 Existence and causation.
5.3 The joint cause.
5.4 Relative existence.
5.5 Bodies are object-makers.
5.6 Actual objects and time.
5.7 A hoard of actual objects.
5.8 Spatiotemporal objects.
6. Consciousness, body, and world.
6.1 The actual world.
6.2 Brains are never isolated.
6.3 Causal carvings.
6.4 Temporal unfolding.
6.5 Causal simultaneity.
6.6 Present and past are relative.
6.7 Time lag debunked.
7. All experience is identity.
7.1 Modes of perception.
7.2 A taxonomy for hallucinations.
7.3 Hallucinations and dreams.
7.4 Identity and hallucination.
7.5 The common-kind assumption turned upside down.
7.6 Illusions.
8. Neuroscientific evidence.
8.1 Penfield and direct brain stimulation.
8.2 Congenitally blind subjects and visual experience.
8.3 Hallucinations caused by sensory blockage.
8.4 Persisting objects.
8.5 Filtering the world: The case of afterimages.
8.6 Supersaturated red and other impossible colors.
9. Subjectivity reloaded.
9.1 Is the phenomenal physical?.
9.2 One kind of property to rule them all.
9.3 Subjective and objective are relative.
9.4 Measurement and causality.
9.5 Experience and knowledge.
9.6 Perceptual error.
9.7 Incorrigibility.
9.8 Feeling vs functioning.
10. A reduction.
10.1 The hard problem.
10.2 Intentionality or aboutness.
10.3 What it is like to be something.
10.4 Points of view and perspectivalness.
10.5 Semantics is identity.
Anchor 55.
11. A comparison with other views.
11.1 Idealism.
11.2 Enactivism.
11.3 Direct realism.
11.4 Russellian monism.
11.5 Panpsychism.
11.6 Soul-less Descartes.
12. The last blow to the narcissism of man.
Index.
